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ABSTRACT: The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak has caused significant disruption to economic and 
social systems. New York City, as the United States’ largest city and among the nation’s most 
densely populated, was an early epicenter of the crisis. Modifications to the design, planning 
and operations of the city’s public realm have been important components of the city’s overall 
response to mitigate the effects of the pandemic while also facilitating economic recovery and 
providing social, educational, and recreational opportunities for city residents. This 
commentary provides an overview of New York City’s urban design responses to COVID-19, 
highlighting some of the successes and limitations of the city’s programs. We conclude by 
arguing that, in order to be effective, short-term crisis response efforts such as these must 
eventually be turned into government policies that not only address immediate urgent crises 
but also begin to facilitate durable long-term recovery and address longstanding systemic 
inequalities and vulnerabilities.  
 
Keywords: COVID-19; coronavirus; economic development; New York city; urban design; public 
space; disaster recovery.  
 
1. COVID-19 as an Urban Design and Planning Challenge  
 
The COVID-19 outbreak presents unique challenges to urban planners and designers, whose 
role in disaster mitigation and recovery is typically more pertinent after events such as 
hurricanes, tsunamis, typhoons, wildfires, mudslides, earthquakes, terror attacks, and industrial 
accidents. While these types of disasters cause extensive and debilitating damage to urban 
assets like homes, businesses, schools, roads, and power systems, pandemics are different 
because they do not cause physical destruction, even if they do take human lives and disrupt 
economic and social networks. Nonetheless, efforts to prevent the spread of the virus, mitigate 
its associated societal impacts, and facilitate economic and social recovery will have important 
urban planning and urban design components as cities re-evaluate how public space is designed 
and used. Lessons from previous physical disasters, therefore, can still inform planners’ ongoing 
responses to COVID-19, while these current efforts will also contribute to an ever-evolving 
understanding of effective disaster recovery strategies for future events. This commentary 
examines New York City’s reimagining of its public realm in response to COVID-19 and provides 
some preliminary observations about these efforts.  




According to New York City’s online COVID-19 tracker, the city of 8.3 million residents had 
495,588 confirmed cases (plus 79,510 probable cases) and 21,699 confirmed deaths (plus 4,949 
probable deaths) from COVID-19 between the first reported case on February 29, 2020 and 
January 25, 2021. Over this chaotic 11 months, the city’s physical landscape was drastically 
transformed in response to the pandemic. Streets, sidewalks, parks, plazas, and schoolyards 
now serve a host of new functions that were relatively rare, if not non-existent, before the 
pandemic. These rapid and widespread changes offer valuable opportunities for critical 
reflection and analysis about the way that design and management of public spaces can be 
used as tools for crisis management.  
 
New York City is only one among thousands of cities across the world that has responded to the 
COVID-19 pandemic by reimaging its public realm. London (UK), Paris (France), Milan (Italy), 
Melbourne (Australia), Budapest (Hungary), Houston (TX, USA), Oakland (CA, USA), and many 
others have also used public space as a mechanism for adaptation to a “new normal” defined 
by social distancing on the one hand, and on the other, the critical need to provide safe space 
for recreation and commerce (Newman 2020; Honey-Rosés et al. 2020; Dunning and Nurse 
2021; Glaser and Krizek 2020; Bereitschaft and Scheller 2020). The city has created new 
initiatives within its Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of Education (DOE) 
focused on creatively utilizing public space to facilitate safe economic activity, schooling, and 
recreation. These include DOT’s Open Streets, Open Restaurants, Open Storefronts, Play 
Streets, and Cool Streets programs, as well as the DOE’s Outdoor Learning Initiative. While the 
city’s efforts have been ambitious, due to the nature of the pandemic, they have also been 
constantly evolving, often confusing, and sometimes contradictory, as the following examples 
will illustrate.  
 
The challenges of creating effective COVID-19 mitigation and recovery efforts are due in part to 
the city’s physical landscape. New York City is the densest large city in the US, with 27,016 
residents per square mile (10,431 per km2). New Yorkers live and work in smaller and more 
tightly packed spaces than most other Americans.1 Pre-pandemic lives revolved heavily around 
public spaces in what Jacobs (1961: 54) called the “sidewalk ballet” of “animated city streets” as 
well as parks, museums, restaurants, theaters, and cafes. Social distancing is exceedingly 
difficult in a city built on human interaction. New York has also had to balance other conflicting 
priorities such as the safety of residents versus the needs of the entrepreneurs who operate the 
city’s 220,000 businesses (City of New York 2015), and the health of school children versus the 
needs of working parents. These priorities do not always align, and conflicts sometimes arise. 
This preliminary commentary cannot fully capture the complex and dynamic nature of the city’s 
response to COVID-19, which is still ongoing. But it can provide context for making some critical 
 
1 While no definitive data on housing sizes exist, recent studies suggest that the average size of attached units in 
New York City (91.3% of the city’s housing stock) is 866 ft2 (Plitt 2016). Single-family homes, which comprise 61.3% 
of the housing in the rest of the US, average about 1,600–1,655 ft2 and also contain backyards, basements, 
garages, and other amenities rare in New York City (Pinsker 2019).  
 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version 
 
 
observations about how the crisis has affected the city’s physical landscape and what urban 
planners and designers elsewhere can learn from the city’s experience.  
 
2. New York City’s Open Streets Program  
 
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, New York City had been slowly rethinking the function of 
its streets, parks, and sidewalks, starting with the administration of former Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg beginning in 2002. In 1997 the city had 119 miles of bicycle paths of any kind (New 
York City Department of City Planning 1997) but had installed an additional 1,100 miles by 2018 
(New York City Department of Transportation 2019). The DOT Plaza Program has created 74 
new public plazas on 30 acres of converted streets since its creation in 2007. Beginning in 2008, 
the Weekend Walks and Summer Streets programs employed temporary street closures to 
enhance pedestrian and recreational use. The Street Seats initiative, launched in 2015, allowed 
applicants to build seating areas in on-street parking spaces to serve as restaurant seating, 
“pocket parks,” and other uses. It was from this base of programs and experiences that the city 
was able to expand its efforts once the COVID-19 crisis exposed the need for additional ways to 
facilitate social distancing in public spaces.  
 
The city’s first confirmed case of COVID-19 was reported on February 29, 2020 although 
evidence suggests that the virus was already widespread in the city before that date (Carey and 
Glanz 2020). By March 7, the city had 12 confirmed cases and New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo declared a statewide state of emergency. New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio moved the 
city’s public school system to fully remote instruction on March 15. On Friday, March 20, 
Governor Cuomo issued the New York PAUSE order beginning at 8 pm on March 22 (eventually 
rescinded on May 28), forcing all non-essential businesses and public facilities in the state to 
close, mandating social distancing, and limiting outdoor activities2. New York City was 
transformed overnight, with affluent residents fleeing for second homes and rural rentals, while 
those residents who remained largely stayed indoors and avoided streets, sidewalks, parks, and 
transit systems.  
 
Vehicular traffic on the city’s 6,000 miles of roadways dropped to an unprecedented low (Plitt 
2020) and residents soon began seeking creative ways to exercise and spend time outdoors 
safely. This led both Governor Cuomo and the Speaker of the New York City Council to publicly 
request that Mayor de Blasio repurpose underutilized streets for recreational purposes. In 
response, the mayor announced a Safe Streets pilot program for the weekend of March 27th–
30th, closing 1.6 miles of city streets from 10 am to 7 pm each day to provide car-free 
recreational space in communities lacking adequate park space. Under continued pressure from 
the governor and council speaker, the mayor later extended these street closures to April 5.  
But this initial Safe Streets experiment was short lived. The mayor declined to extend the 
program after April 5 citing underutilization by the public and the cost of New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) oversight. The City Council subsequently introduced a bill on April 22 
requiring the DOT to identify and implement 75 miles of car-free streets across the city.  
 
2 2https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-new-york-state-pause-executive-order 




Five days later, the mayor unveiled a new Open Streets initiative to prioritize bicycling and 
pedestrian access on 100 miles of city streets and sidewalks through street closures, sidewalk 
widening, and new bike lanes. An initial 7.2 miles of pedestrian streets were implemented with 
temporary barricades and signage on May 4, and 1.9 additional miles on May 7. The DOT 
partnered with Businesses Improvement Districts, civic groups, and city agencies including 
NYPD and NYC Parks to facilitate daily 8 am to 8pm closures. Community-based organizations 
were also invited to propose additional Open Street locations and new locations were added to 
the program throughout May and June. An overlapping Cool Streets program also provided 
shade structures, fire hydrant spray caps, and other outdoor cooling tactics on Open Streets in 
neighborhoods with high heat vulnerability risks. In July, ten Open Streets comprising slightly 
less than 2 miles were also designated Play Streets offering outdoor recreation opportunities 
and programming from partnering non-profit organizations including the Fresh Air Fund, the 
Police Athletic League, and Street Lab.  
 
3. Open Restaurants, Open Storefronts and Outdoor Learning  
 
New York City’s bars and restaurants provide 15% of the city’s sales tax base and supply 
317,800 jobs (Office of the New York State Comptroller 2020). The industry quickly seized on 
the success of the Open Streets program as a potential economic lifeline for restaurants. In 
mid-May, a group of City Council members and the Manhattan Borough President formally 
requested that the city develop a plan to facilitate expanded outdoor dining3. While the city has 
long allowed sidewalk dining in limited locations and created the Street Seats program in 2015, 
these options had always been expensive and heavily regulated, constraining most restaurants’ 
ability to provide outdoor dining. On June 18, the city formally launched the Open Restaurants 
program, providing expedited permits for sidewalk and parking space seating, as well as on 
streets closed through the Open Streets program and pre-existing DOT-managed public plazas. 
Originally in effect until October 31st, Open Restaurants was later made permanent and year-
round; as of December 31, 2020, the program had 10,854 enrollees citywide, slightly more than 
one-third of the city’s 28,896 bars and restaurants [see Table 1]. Within days of the program’s 
launch, some restaurants had already received permits to commandeer adjacent parking areas 
for seating with simple preliminary interventions becoming more sophisticated over the course 
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 Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten Island NYC Total 
Total number of licensed 
restaurants as of February, 
2020 
2,559 7,322 11,408 6,560 1,047 28,896 
Total Open Restaurants 
program participants 
615 2,658 5,275 2,273 178 10,999 
Open Restaurants program 
participants as percentage 
of total pre-pandemic 
establishments  
24.0% 36.3% 46.2% 34.6% 17.0% 38.1% 
Open Restaurants program 
roadway Seating 
24  233  582 170 9 1,018 
Open Restaurants program 
sidewalk Seating 
295 1,068 1,772 882 87 4,104 
Open Restaurants program 
roadway and sidewalk 
Seating 
284 1,261 2,722 1,173 78 5,518 
Open Restaurants program 
Open Streets seating 
12 96  199 48 4 359 
 
Table 1. New York City Open Restaurants Program Enrollees by Borough as of February 15, 2020. Courtesy of NYC 




Figure 1. Within days of the launch of the Open Restaurants program, simple outdoor seating areas like the one 




Figure 2. By December, many restaurants had invested in more ambitious outdoor structures to entice customers 
during less hospitable weather. Photo by the author.  
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To support retail and service businesses, the city also created the Open Storefronts program at 
the end of October, allowing businesses to use sidewalks for displaying retail goods, seating, 
and queuing. Shops adjacent to an Open Street were also allowed to use the street space in 
front of their business. Focused on the holiday shopping season, the program originally 
operated from October 30 to December 31, and unlike the Open Restaurants program, did not 
allow retailers to apply for use of adjacent parking spaces or build outdoor structures over 5 ft 
tall. Later extended to September 30, 2021, the program has nonetheless proved less popular 
than the Open Restaurants program, with only 687 participants citywide as of February 15, 
2021.  
 
After moving to online instruction in March, the mayor committed to reopening the city’s 1,606 
public schools for in-person instruction by September of 2020. But the DOE initially appeared to 
ignore advocates’ calls for the use of outdoor classrooms, only unveiling its Outdoor Learning 
Initiative less than a month before the start of the school year. Despite the short application 
window, more than 1,100 public, private, and charter schools applied to use schoolyards, city 
parks, and closed streets for educational space. Almost all applicants were ultimately approved 
including at least 85 that requested closing an adjacent street and more than 200 requesting to 
use city park space (Elsen-Rooney 2020).  
 
4. The 34th Avenue Open Street in Jackson Heights  
 
While the Open Streets program was originally designed as a temporary emergency program, 
some neighborhoods quickly began to advocate for the city to make Open Streets segments 
permanent (Colon 2020). 34th Avenue, which bisects the Jackson Heights neighborhood in the 
northern part of the Borough of Queens, illustrates how the Open Streets program evolved 
from a weekend pilot program in March to calls for permanent street redesigns in some 
neighborhoods a few months later.4 Jackson Heights and surrounding neighborhoods were the 
epicenter of the city’s COVID-19 crisis in the spring of 2020 (Correal and Jacobs 2020) and are 
located in one of the most park-starved corners of the city (New Yorkers for Parks 2010). Only 
eight blocks of 34th Avenue were first designated as a pedestrian priority street in April, but 
owing to advocacy by the neighborhood’s elected officials and local community groups, a 26 
block (1.3 mile) stretch of the avenue was ultimately closed through traffic from 8 am to 8 pm, 
with parking and 5 mph local access allowed. The 50-foot-wide two-way street and its planted 
median quickly became a popular neighborhood resource for walking, jogging, bicycling, 
outdoor exercise classes, and even passive relaxation [Knoll 2020; see Figure 3].  
 
In early September, citing widespread community support, the neighborhood’s City Council 
member issued a formal request to the DOT to make 34th Avenue a permanent car-free or 
limited access street. A subsequent petition drive gathered over 1,500 signatures and hundreds 
of local residents were joined by elected officials from across the city for a rally on October 24th 
 
4 The author is a resident of Jackson Heights.  
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demanding that the mayor designate 34th Avenue as a permanent Open Street [see Figure 4]. 
Within days, the  
 
DOT committed to making long-term changes to 34th Avenue through a community-based 
design process. The first of these events, an online “Information and Listening Session” hosted 
by the DOT on December 2nd had more than 550 virtual attendees expressing strong and 
varied opinions about the concept of redesigning 34th Avenue as a permanently automobile-
limited thoroughfare. Simultaneously, other neighborhoods were making similar demands and 
on January 28, 2021 Mayor de Blasio announced in his final State of the City speech that the 
Open Streets program, along with a number of other pandemic streetscape programs, would be 
made permanent although no specific details were provided (City of New York 2021). An Open 
Culture program, created by the City Council, also went into effect in January 2021, providing a 
legal mechanism for local arts and non-profit groups to use Open Streets for artistic and cultural 




Figure 3. The 34th Avenue Open Street in Jackson Heights, Queens has become a well-used multi-use open space 
for local residents. Photo by the author.  
 
 
Figure 4. Jackson Heights residents organized a rally on October 24, 2020 to advocate for making 34th Avenue a 
permanent Open Street. Photo by the author.  
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5. How can Lessons from Previous Disasters Help Inform Ongoing COVID-19 Responses?  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a singularly calamitous event. After 11 months, the virus and 
its associated economic and social repercussions continue to spread. Preventing COVID-19 
replication while supporting local businesses and facilitating safe social interactions continue to 
be critical goals, and the city’s responses continue to evolve. This section summarizes four 
broad lessons from the study of previous disasters that are pertinent for helping city planners 
and urban designers continue to effectively respond to this crisis.  
 
5.1. Lesson 1: There is always opportunity in chaos  
 
New York City’s experience with COVID-19 confirms one of the most longstanding lessons of 
disaster recovery: chaos and destruction, paradoxically, always provide opportunities for 
positive change. Among the earliest scholarly analyses of disasters, sociologist Prince’s (1920: 
144) book Catastrophe and Social Change examined the December 6, 1917 munitions ship 
explosion in Halifax, Novia Scotia that killed almost 2,000 people and injured 9,000 more. 
Making an observation that has since become commonplace, Prince offered that the Halifax 
explosion was both a tragedy and “preparation of the ground for an inrush of the spirit of 
progress”. Plainly stated, while disasters can cause horrific pain and destruction, they can also 
generate opportunities for creative recovery that will make communities better off in the long 
run. When weather-related or geophysical hazards cause physical destruction, damaged 
buildings and infrastructure can be replaced with more resilient structures, while citizens and 
local officials are willing to consider changes that address newfound risks the disaster has 
exposed (Rubin et al. 1985). While COVID-19 lacks the physical destruction of an earthquake or 
tornado, the willingness to accept a “new normal” — even if temporarily — has provided a 
window of opportunity for urban design and planning approaches that might have never been 
politically feasible without the urgency of the pandemic and the need to balance hazard 
mitigation with other urban development goals (Berke et al. 1993). Over one-third of city 
restaurants are currently participating in the Open Restaurants program, and while this is 
insufficient to support restaurants indefinitely, the program has been popular with the public. 
Despite some challenges, Open Streets projects such as 34th Avenue have also been locally 
popular, and now both programs have been made permanent by the mayor. In a city that has 
often struggled with bureaucratic inertia in its efforts to make the public realm more pedestrian 
and bicycle friendly, the pandemic has facilitated actions that might have taken decades or 
never happened otherwise.  
 
5.2. Lesson 2: Understanding system complexity is central to effective disaster response  
 
To effectively address the urgent, interconnected, and cascading elements of disaster response 
and mitigation of future hazards, cities have to think strategically, act proactively, and embrace 
complexity as opposed to relying only on discrete tactics that are ad hoc, reactive, and 
piecemeal (Dynes et al. 1972; Rubin et al. 1985; Alesch and Siembieda 2012). New York’s urban 
design responses to COVID-19 illustrate this challenge of operating with a context of extreme 
complexity while still moving quickly to address urgent challenges.  




For example, the Open Restaurants program continues to face new challenges as the city 
attempts to integrate the program into its existing regulatory apparatus. Some restaurant 
owners have spent tens of thousands of dollars upgrading outdoor dining structures, many of 
which are now fully enclosed with heat and electricity. But this raises new questions that the 
existing programs and attendant bureaucracy are poorly equipped to deal with: Are these 
structures still under the purview of the DOT because they sit on streets and sidewalks? Or 
have they in fact become “buildings” under the jurisdiction of the Department of Buildings? 
When “indoor” dining is restricted because of increasing COVID-19 caseloads in the city, are 
these structures allowed to remain in operation even though they may lack the efficient air-
handling mechanisms available inside some restaurants? Is it more important to prioritize 
outdoor dining or transportation on public thoroughfares (e.g., Ricciulli 2020)? When a 
December snowstorm dropped six inches of snow on the city, the mayor temporarily 
suspended the Open Streets program and suggested that restaurants remove their dining 
structures from the streets to facilitate snow plowing, even though many such structures are 
essentially small buildings that cannot be easily moved (Gold 2020). In addition to this shifting 
landscape of evolving and sometimes contradictory rules and regulations, inconsistencies 
between state and city policies have also been a source of consternation for business owners. 
Finding a balance across the city’s various regulatory, economic and infrastructure systems, 
while facilitating economic activity and enforcing public safety, will be ongoing challenges as 
the city struggles to create a lifeline for small businesses and avoid overly punitive enforcement 
of sometimes confusing regulations.  
 
5.3. Lesson 3: Effective response demands a balance between planning and acting  
 
Every disaster is unique and recovery programs must always be developed anew in the midst of 
a crisis while responding to evolving needs in real time (Finn and Marshall 2018), resembling 
the process of “building the plane while it is in flight” (Leicht 2017). Most of the programs 
reported here had to be designed and scaled up in a short timeframe with no opportunity to 
test them first, leading to sometimes chaotic implementation. This highlights a central paradox 
of disaster management, the need to “slow down to speed up” (Chandrasekhar et al. 2014: 
381) and find a balance between quick action and deliberative decision-making (Olshansky 
2006; Olshansky and Johnson 2010). In normal times, new policies are carefully planned, 
thoroughly analyzed, and implemented slowly in order to identify potential problems. Spending 
valuable time to refine and perfect new strategies after a disaster means foregoing 
opportunities to address pressing needs, but finding this balance is important. While New York 
moved slowly in comparison to cities like Oakland, CA and Paris, France, it is also clear that the 
city’s efforts could have nonetheless benefitted from even a brief period of strategic 
engagement with restaurant owners, Safe Streets advocates, educators, and other stakeholders 
during the planning stages. This approach might have helped identify some of the key 
challenges that the programs would ultimately face. Instead, the city was relatively slow to take 
action in comparison to many peer communities, and yet still failed to use that extra time to 
engage in robust stakeholder engagement.  
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5.4. Lesson 4: Effective post-disaster governance mostly happens before the disaster  
 
A final lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic that is consistent with previous disasters relates to the 
role of bureaucracies in the recovery process. Governments, because of the inherent 
characteristics of bureaucracies, often serve as barriers to effective recovery even as they 
attempt to empower it. In many cases new organizations or systems are created to facilitate 
recovery because there is a need to circumvent existing ponderous bureaucratic systems 
(Johnson and Olshansky 2017). In order to be most effective, New York City realized early in the 
pandemic that heavy-handed, top-down approaches would be ineffectual in the COVID context, 
and additionally, were beyond the financial means of a city in economic freefall. Instead, city 
officials recognized quickly that the city could serve its constituents best by providing 
information, flexible recovery programs, and technical support, empowering local residents to 
innovate, move quickly, and thus facilitate their own recovery. For the most part, New York City 
achieved this by looking to existing programs like the DOT Public Plaza and Street Seats 
programs, which provided frameworks that could be scaled up quickly and effectively with 
simplified permitting processes, limited government oversight, and wide latitude, with the 
expectation that problematic implementation challenges could be addressed only when and if 
they arose. After that, the city mostly got out of the way and allowed neighborhood groups, 
restaurant owners, Business Improvement Districts, and other stakeholders to innovate as their 
resources allowed and location conditions dictated. Thus, one important lesson for cities is that 
pre-disaster preparation strategies should in part emphasize empowering residents and 
entrepreneurs by building civic and economic capacity at the local level, so that they are better 
equipped to act as agents of their own recovery when the need arises (Campanella 2006).  
 
6. How do New York City’s Experiences Contribute to Better Disaster Response in the Future?  
 
Lessons learned by New York and other cities will undoubtedly contribute to the ongoing 
evolution of disaster management in the future. But it will be important to monitor how 
effective these efforts are at supporting local businesses and addressing other goals over the 
longer term. Further analysis of the city’s COVID-19 response should focus on three important 
topics.  
 
The first issue relates to the social equity considerations of these programs. While the city has 
created systems for creatively using public space that were almost unimaginable before COVID-
19 emerged, they nonetheless shift much of the burden for costs and administration onto 
community members, local non-profit groups, and small business owners. Many of New York’s 
most densely populated neighborhoods — which need social distancing and outdoor recreation 
opportunities the most — are also low-income communities of color that may lack the  
kinds of formal social capital necessary to help operate an Open Street in partnership with the 
city. In Jackson Heights, for example, advocacy for creating and expanding the 34th Avenue 
Open Street was only successful because it harnessed the human capital built from more than a 
decade of concerted neighborhood organizing around street safety and open space access (e.g., 
Kazis 2010). Likewise, schools that were able to purchase equipment to participate in the DOE’s 
Outdoor Learning Initiative often did so through donations from affluent parents while schools 
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without such resources were unable to avail themselves of these opportunities. Other equity 
issues also deserve ongoing scrutiny. For instance, people with disabilities, bicyclists, young 
parents pushing strollers, and other groups may be negatively impacted by a more cluttered 
and complex streetscape. The use of public streets by for-profit businesses has also been a 
subject of debate, though the general consensus among city residents seems to suggest that 
the vitality of each neighborhood is so dependent on its local businesses that the inherent 
tradeoffs are worth making. It will be important to monitor the implications of this as the 
immediate crisis recedes.  
 
The second issue relates to economic equity. Allowing restaurants and stores to utilize public 
space for commercial purposes is creative, but it is only a partial solution for many businesses, 
and no solution at all for others. Many shops and restaurants — especially small businesses in 
lower income neighborhoods — lack the resources to purchase the infrastructure necessary to 
support a shift to outdoor dining or retail sales. Businesses located in narrow storefronts, upper 
floors, next to a bus stop or fire hydrant, or along narrow streets and sidewalks will likewise be 
left out. Some restaurants have also reported being aggressively ticketed by the NYPD and the 
New York State Liquor Authority for minor infractions. Unless logistical and operational 
challenges, financial limitations, and enforcement inequities are addressed alongside the more 
technical urban design issues, these well-meaning programs will fail to help many of the most 
vulnerable businesses by creating new sets of challenges that cancel out any potential benefits.  
Finally, safety must continue to be a paramount concern. The city has not yet allocated any 
capital funds for permanent design changes that would enhance the safety of these programs. 
Though they are experimental solutions developed during a crisis, these efforts will require 
further refinement in order to be sustainable and safe. For instance, the city will need to 
balance the economic imperative for allowing outdoor dining and recreation with public safety. 
Open Streets and Open Restaurants locations create automobile crash risks for pedestrians and 
diners, and in some locations drivers have begun to ignore the ad hoc signage and protective 
devices delineating Open Streets locations. Many Open Restaurants participants have built 
ambitious outdoor seating facilities but limited oversight from the DOT and DOB — as well as 
sparse inspections and enforcement — also means that some structures may present a safety 
risk during a hurricane or when loaded with a foot of wet snow. Evolving more ambitious design 
standards for Open Streets and Open Restaurants locations, allocating capital funding to create 
permanent safety improvements, as well as prioritizing traffic and code enforcement, will be 
important to maintain public safety going forward.  
 




Figure 5. Confusing regulations and uneven enforcement have occasionally resulted in Open Restaurants designs 
that cause public safety and public access concerns. Photo by the author.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Creative reimagining of the public realm has been a small but important piece of New York 
City’s COVID-19 mitigation and recovery strategy. In less than a year, the city’s streetscape has 
been drastically altered to allow for both social distancing and economic activity. Creating the 
policies and programs to support these changes has been uneven and imperfect, but this is 
expected in rapidly evolving, resource-and-information constrained crisis situations. The 
qualified successes, nevertheless, illustrate what is possible when a crisis empowers action. The 
programs that have allowed the city to muddle through the first year of the pandemic have 
been improvisational and experimental and were not designed to be permanent. But as the 
pandemic stretches into 2021 and its associated economic crisis continues unabated, it appears 
increasingly likely that many of these emergency measures have proved successful and have 
public support. When COVID-19 risks finally begin to recede, these temporary response 
strategies will need to be rethought as permanent policies and structural changes to the 
cityscape. That will require a systematic review of what has worked well and what has failed, in 
addition to overcoming some of the key operational and social equity challenges identified 
above.  
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